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This thesis investigates a new concept in Naval Avia-
tion: total contractor logistics support. The Federal
Government's policy of relying on the private sector for
goods and services, as promulgated in 0MB Circular No. A-76,
is examined in depth. The history and present experiences
of the military services concerning contractor aviation
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T-4M-A program, including the acquisition, total logistics
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1977, the Navy received the first T-44A twin-
engine trainer of a planned 6 6 unit aircraft buy. The ad-
vent of the T-M-4A ushers in a completely new concept in
Naval Aviation: a "turn key" operation of aircraft by the
Navy brought about by total contractor logistics support.
This concept involves a Contractor On-Site Support Center
at the operating base which is totally responsible for all
aircraft maintenance and supply support, as well as other
logistics support functions such as maintaining a Technical
Library and providing and maintaining the required Ground
Support Equipment. The Navy's responsibilities in this new
program are limited to ground training and flying the air-
craft .
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor
more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle,
than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer
has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only
lukewarm defenders in all who profit by the new order.
This lukewarmness arises partly from the fear of their
adversaries who have the law in their favour, and partly
from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe
in anything new until they have actual experience of it
£7-
Although the above quotation was written by Machiovelli in
1513, it is equally applicable today.
A. OBJECTIVE
It is the objective of this thesis to evaluate the con-
cept of total contractor logistics support in Naval Aviation

To accomplish this objective the sequence of events that
culminated in total contractor logistics support for the
T-44A program and the T-44A acquisition are examined, and
the advantages and disadvantages of this new concept are
analyzed. During the course of this study the following
specific questions are addressed:
1. What Federal Government Policy allows this magni-
tude of contractor support services?
2. What experiences have the military services had
with contractor aviation logistics support?
3. Why did the Navy choose the T-4 4A program as its
first experience with total contractor logistics
support?
4. How does the T-44A logistics support contract
function administratively?




What are the advantages and disadvantages of total
contractor aviation logistics support?
B. LIMITATIONS
Contractor aviation logistics support takes many forms
such as: Contractor depot maintenance, interim contractor
support, contractor material support, contractor material
support plus intermediate/depot maintenance support, and
total contractor logistics support. All of the above forms
of contractor logistics support are discussed in this

thesis; however, the primary emphasis concentrates on the
new concept of total contractor logistics support.
There are many DOD, Air Force, Army, and Navy direc-
tives concerning the utilization of services contracts.
This thesis was not written strictly within the framework
of these directives because of their transitory nature
which would severely limit the useful life of a paper tied
too closely to specific directives. Therefore, specific
reference to directives is avoided in an attempt to make
this thesis a valuable reference concerning contractor
aviation logistics support concepts, instead of a paper
explaining existing directives.
Total contractor logistics support includes provisions
for a contractor On-Site Support Center to accomplish the
required aviation logistics support functions; therefore,
the scope of this thesis is limited in application to land-
based Naval Aviation activities.
Finally, although the experiences of the Army and Air
Force in the area of contractor aviation logistics support
are discussed, it is done in a broad and general sense, and
certainly not in the depth that the Navy experience is
covered.
C. OVERVIEW
In Section II, the history of the Federal Government's
policy on the services contract is examined and the present
policy as promulgated by 0MB Circular No. A-76 is discussed
in detail. Also, the history and present experiences of
10

the Army, Air Force and Navy concerning contractor aviation
logistics support are discussed, with specific emphasis on
the Navy experience.
The T-M-M-A acquisition and the details of the logistics
support contract are covered in Section III. In addition,
the contractor's On-Site Support Center is explained, and a
brief review of the first six month's experience with the
T-44A support contract is provided.
Section IV contains an analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of total contractor support and other types
of contractor aviation support.
A summary of the thesis and the author's conclusions
and recommendations are contained in Section V.
11

II. HISTORY OF CONTRACTOR AVIATION
LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN POD
A. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CIRCULAR NO. A-76
For over 22 years it has been the policy of the Federal
Government to rely, to the maximum extent, on the private
sector for goods and services. This policy was first pro-
mulgated in January 1955, when the Bureau of the Budget
(BOB) issued Bulletin 55-4 plj . This Bulletin established
the general policy that the Federal Government would not
start or carry on any commercial-industrial activity to pro-
vide a service or product for its own use if such a product
or service could be procured from private enterprise through
ordinary business channels. With minor changes, the Federal
Government's policy of reliance on the private sector was
repeated in BOB Bulletin 57-7 (April 1957) and BOB Bulletin
60-2 (September 1959). Although these Bulletins emphasized
the Federal Government's policy to rely on the private enter-
prise system to supply its needs, they were not specific on
how the policy should be applied. This deficiency was re-
cognized by the late President Johnson in a memorandum to
Heads of Departments and Agencies on 3 March 1966
~TJ .
We must seek in every feasible way to reduce the cost
of carrying out our governmental programs . But we must
remember that our budgetary costs our out-of-pocket
expenditures do not always provide a true measure of
the costs of Government activities. This is often true
when the Government undertakes to provide for itself a




At the same time, it is desirable or even necessary,
in some instances for the Government to produce directly
certain products or services for its own use. This ac-
tion may be dictated by program requirements , or by lack
of an acceptable source or because significant dollar
savings may result.
Decisions which involve the question of whether the
Government provides directly, products or services for
its own use must be exercised under uniform guidelines
and principles. This is necessary in order
to conduct the affairs of the Government on an
orderly basis
to limit budgetary costs; and
to maintain the Government's policy of reliance
upon private enterprise.
At my direction the Director of the BOB is issuing
detailed guidelines to determine when the Government
should provide products and services for its own use
.
These guidelines are the result of long study, based on
experience over the past six years since the guidelines
were issued.
The detailed guidelines President Johnson referred to were
promulgated in BOB Circular No. A-76, "Policies for Acquir-
ing Commercial or Industrial Products and Services for
Government Use," on 3 March 1966. This same Bulletin has
been reissued in its present form as Office of Management
and Budget (0MB) Circular No. A-7 6. Although only nine
pages long, A-76 definitizes the Federal Government's "go
commercial" policy concerning products and services. The
first aspect of A-76 which should be noted is that it makes
no distinction between a product and a service. Therefore,
according to A-76, contracting for aircraft maintenance
should be treated the same as purchasing an off-the-shelf
commercial product. The Circular is specific concerning
products or services obtainable from the private sector:
"No Executive Agency will initiate a "New Start" or continue
13

the operation of an existing Government commercial or indus-
trial activity except as specifically required by law or as
provided by this circular." A "New Start" is a newly estab-
lished Government commercial or industrial activity involv-
ing additional capital investment of $25,000 or more, or
additional annual costs of production of $50,000 or more jj£J
Circular A-76 provides five instances when it is in the
national interest for the Government to provide directly
the products and services it uses.
1. Procurement of a product or service from a commer-
cial source would disrupt or materially delay an Agen-
cy's program.
2. It is necessary for the Government to conduct a
commercial or industrial activity for purposes of com-
bat support, or for individual and unit retraining of
military personnel, or to maintain or strengthen
mobilization readiness.
3. A satisfactory commercial source is not available
and cannot be developed in time to provide a product
or service when it is needed.
M- . The product or service is available from another
Faderal Agency.
5 . Procurement of the product or service from a com-
mercial source will result in higher cost to the
Government.
Circular A-76 further stipulates: "A decision to rely upon
a Government activity for reasons involving cost must be
supported by a comparative cost analysis which will disclose
as accurately as possible the difference between the cost
the Government is incurring or will incur under each alter-
native." It is important to note that a cost comparison is
required only when a Government agency contemplates an in-
house operation. A cost comparison is not required when
14

going commercial. A-76 includes specific details on how a
cost comparison should be conducted, and concludes that
section by stating: "A "New Start" ordinarily should not
be approved unless costs of a Government activity will be
at least ten percent less than costs of obtaining the prod-
uct or service from commercial sources." Circular A-76 sets
forth three additional major requirements relating to admin-
istration of the Government's policy.
1. Each agency will compile and maintain an inventory
of its commercial or industrial activities having an
annual output of products costing $50,000 or more, or
a capital investment of $25,000 or more.
2. A "New Start" should not be initiated until possi-
bilities of obtaining the product or service from com-
mercial sources have been explored and not until it is
approved by the Agency Head or by an Assistant Secretary
or official of equivalent rank on the basis of factual
justification for establishing the activity under the
provisions of this Circular.
3. A systematic review of existing commercial or in-
dustrial activities should be maintained in each agency
under the direction of the Agency Head. Activities re-
maining in the inventory afier June 30, 1963, should be
scheduled for at least one additional follow-up review
during each three-year period.
Although the Federal Government's policy of relying on
the private sector for products and services has been in
existence for over 22 years and is specifically detailed
in 0MB Circular No. A-76, the progress of the Federal Govern-
ment, including the DOD, in implementing this policy has
disappointed many. In 1971, 0MB requested a special report
from the agencies on the status of their commercial and
industrial activities. The reports to 0MB showed that /5/
:
2,899 activities (16 percent) had not been reviewed,




With more than 15,000 activities reviewed, only 99 were
discontinued as a result of review.
Of the 55 New Starts proposed since October 31, 1967,
44 were approved, 9 were pending, and two were disap-
proved.
Concerning the area of support activities, Edward C. Lesson,
Executive Director of the National Council of Technical Ser-
vice Industries stated /6/
:
There is no reason why such a policy should not be
followed in an economy such as now exists in the U.S. -
where the working force is comprised 60% by people en-
gaged in service type, non-product activities where the
private sector can, and does, provide every conceivable
type service in a competitive environment.
Concerning the distinction between a product or a service,
Major Robert L. Nier, USA, stated FT] :
...in terms of regulatory or management requirements or
procedures, A-76 makes no distinction between a product
or service. Yet in terms of actual implementation, the
Department of Defense and its agencies have almost
separated the two goods . The procurement of products
has been implemented more extensively, has more guidance,
functions with less problems, and is currently subject
to less criticism.
Concerning the historical ineffectiveness of A-76, John F.
Judge
,
Editor of Government Executive , stated
t
1T7 :
The historical ineffectiveness of A-76 is in part
due to its lone position - there are no Statutes or
Federal Laws to back it up. And the Service Contract
Act of 1965 helps too. This Act means, in effect, that
before a contract can be let, the Labor Department will
determine what the prevailing wage rate is in the area
where the contract is to be performed - and the winning
bidder must pay that rate to employees working under the
contract
.
The Department of Defense has also had problems making
progress with the policy of A-76. In 1972, the GAO reported
/ 7/ that reviews of commercial and industrial activities by
16

the military departments had not been effective and listed
the following deficiencies
:
Except in a few cases where cost studies had been
made, there were no explanations supporting local recom-
mendations that in-house performance of activities be
continued.
Although the Air Force and the Navy spent $1.7
billion for in-house, depot level maintenance in FY
1969, they did not review these activities as required
by Circular A-76.
Although the military departments should have com-
pleted the first three-year cycle of reviews by June 30,
196 8, they were all far behind schedule. As of June
19 71, many activities had not been reviewed for the
first time.
The Army installations visited had started new in-
house activities which had not been subjected to the
analysis required under A-76, nor included in the inven-
tory as required. Installation officials were net aware
of the requirement for "New Start" approval.
The Department of Defense has made significant progress
in the service contract area in the past few years. For ex-
ample, DOD service contracts for maintenance and repair of
equipment increased from $0.77 billion in 1973 to $1.87
billion in 1976 and aircraft/aircraft engine repair/modifi-
cation/rebuilding service contracts increased from $0.64
billion to $1.25 billion during the same period / 8/ . Al-
though significant progress towards implementing A-76 has
been made in DOD, there is still a long way to go. It is
estimated that as late as 1975, there were about 400,000
military and civilian personnel in DOD performing services
ostensibly available from private enterprise nTJ .
B. ARMY EXPERIENCE
The first contractor aviation logistic support of any
consequence occurred in the Army during World War II. The
17

reason for turning to contractors for support was not for
economy or effectiveness, but simply for national survival.
Before World War II, the United States Army Air Corps was
graduating less than 500 pilots a year from flight training
/10/ . The war in Europe was rapidly expanding and the Army
Air Corps needed more pilots than it could train in-house
.
In May 1939, the late General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the
Air Corps, called a group of aviation contractors into his
office for a meeting. According to a transcript of the meet-
ign kept by one of the contractors, the following transpired
(the quotes are General Arnold's) /ll/ :
"We've been doing a lot of talking for about a year.
We've investigated you people and now we're going to act.
There's going to be a war, and it's going to bust right
open, and we've got to build an Air Force."
Then he said that on July 1 we were going to get 5
Cadets and it would be our job "to train 'em and teach
'em to fly." Then he looked at us, into the face of each
of us. "If you let me down on this," he said, "God help
us all." He wasn't in the room more than 5 minutes.
History has recorded that the contractors did not let General
Arnold down. From the initial 5 Cadets the Civilian Flying
Schools trained in 19 39, they expanded until they trained
81,024 pilots in 1944. All told the 60 Civilian Flying
Schools trained nearly 200,000 pilots in the primary phase
of pilot training during World War II /1 2/ . After the war
some of the high ranking German Officers expressed surprise
at the ability of the United States to train so many pilots
in such a short time /ll/ .
We didn't believe that was possible because we knew
at the outset of WW II you had a very small Army Air Corps
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and we didn't see how you could possibly take the neces-
sary number of Air Force Officers out of that small cadre
you had to do the training and do the other jobs of
logistics and combat.
This review of Army Air Corps history during World War II
establishes several important concepts concerning aviation
logistic support. First, although the primary emphasis con-
cerning the Civilian Contract Flying Schools was on training
pilots, the contracts also provided for total contractor
logistics support of the training operation. Second, utili-
zation of the civilian sector in coordination with an in-
house capability provided the flexibility required for such
a great surge in the pilot training effort. Finally, utili-
zation of civilian contractors for logistic support made it
possible for the Army to assign military personnel to more
directly related combat functions.
Although the Civilian Contract Flying Schools were
phased out after the war, the Army still uses contractor
logistics support to complement its in-house capability. For
example, the Army utilizes total contractor aviation logis-
tics support at Fort Rucker and other large training bases
while at the same time maintaining an in-house capability
for organizational and intermediate level maintenance at
smaller bases . The Army also maintains an in-house depot
level maintenance capability, such as the Corpus Christi
Army Depot, a helicopter repair facility which employs over
4,000 personnel. The Army's use of contractor aviation
logistic support has resulted in economy and flexibility.
The economy is achieved primarily from saving the expense
19

of training mechanics and the stability provided by a per-
manently established civilian maintenance facility /12/ .
Civilian contract support provides the Army with the flexi-
bility required during periods of increased tension and
military build-up. For example, during the Viet Nam build-
up the hours flown at the Aviation School, Fort Rucker in-
creased from 33,675 in August 1965 to 61,314 in August 1966,
and during this period the contractor at Fort Rucker in-
creased his work force from approximately 2,200 to 2,900
employees /13/ Although the contractor increased his work
force, the manpower available in the area was not sufficient
to meet the surge in training required. Because the Army
had retained an in-house aircraft maintenance capability,
it was possible to divert some of the depot level mainten-
ance workload to the Atlanta Army Depot Aircraft Maintenance
Activity. In this case, neither the contractor nor the Army
acting alone could handle the increased logistic support
workload required, but with both expanding their efforts in
coordination, the crisis could be met.
The Army's recent experience with contractor aviation
logistic support is outlined in the following synopsis of
an interview with Mr. Raymond Powers, ILS Branch Chief, Army
Troop Support and Readiness Command /1M-/ .
Most major Army aviation training bases have total
contractor aviation logistics support which includes
organizational, intermediate, and depot level mainten-
ance and supply support. Smaller Army aviation bases




The Army's experience with contractor logistics sup-
port has been favorable. At Fort Rucker the Army has used
total contractor logistics support since the early 1950 T s.
The contracts last about three years, and although there
have been several different contractors at Fort Rucker,
there have been no major problems.
The contractor at Fort Rucker is responsible for all
the aviation logistics support for seven different air-
craft types at several outlying airfields. The Army pro-
vides all the flight instruction at Fort Rucker except
for instrument training which is accomplished by another
contractor.
C. AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
When the Air Force was established as a separate service
in 1947, all of its aviation logistics support was performed
in-house. The Civilian Contract Flying Schools had been dis-
established, and the in-house depot maintenance operation
had been reduced to 30% of its World War II level /I 5/ .
However, as the on-set of World War II had dictated that the
Army turn to contractors to train pilots, the Berlin block-
ade by the USSR in 1948 prompted the Air Force to turn to
contractors to supplement the inadequate Air Force in-house
depot maintenance capability.
The aerial resupply of Berlin during this crisis
caused an overnight expansion of airlift requirements.
The demands of an expanded aircraft program during 194 8
meant more flying, and the increase in flying time re-
sulted in the need for more and more area support or
maintenance work. With the depot workload greater than
in-house resources, the Directorate of Supply and Main-
tenance at Headquarters , Air Materiel Command had no
alternative but to turn to industry for help /15/ .
The contractors selected by the Air Force were those already
engaged in depot maintenance of the civilian versions of
the Air Force transports (C-47 and C-54), thus enabling the
contractors to commence the Air Force workload with minimum
21

lead time. Because of the success with contractor depot
maintenance experienced during the Berlin Blockade, the Air
Force expanded its contractor depot maintenance from zero
in 1947 to 54% of the total in 1957 where the growth
leveled off to the present 50% level.
The first Air Force experience with total contractor
aviation logistics support came with the return to primary-
pilot training by Civilian Contract Flying Schools in 1951.
Again, as with The Army Air Corps experience with contract
primary pilot training in World War II, the primary emphasis
was on the pilot training aspect of the contracts. However,
the logistics support functions were procured in the con-
tracts along with the pilot training requirements. The Air
Force experience with the Contract Flying Schools was excel-
lent. The contractors were able to perform normal aircraft
maintenance functions with fewer personnel than the Air
Force had required, while at the same time providing unpre-
cedented versatility and maintenance capability. The follow-
ing examples of the versatility and capability of aircraft
maintenance of the Contract Flying Schools is quoted from
a thesis by Major W. Dunning, USAF / 1
3
/ .
Deficiencies in the J-69-T-9 engine prompted the Air
Force to purchase a modification to change the T-9 to a
J-69-T-25 engine configuration. This modification re-
placed all but six internal engine components and resulted
in raising the engine thrust rating from 9 20 pounds in the
T-9 to 102 5 pounds in the T-2 5. Almost the entire fleet
of T-37 aircraft installed and spare engines were modified
at base level
, by civilian contract maintenance personnel.
The T-9 to T-25 modification changed the aircraft model
number from T-3 7A to T-3 7B and to the author's knowledge
was the first time in Air Force history that an engine and
aircraft model change had been accomplished at base level.
22

The Inspect and Repair as Necessary (IRAN) program is
a recognized Air Force depot level system of extensive
major maintenance of aircraft. T-37 IRAN work require-
ments were incorporated into periodic maintenance inspec-
tions and were performed by all six Civilian Contract
Flying School maintenance organizations. This removed
the T-37 aircraft from any further requirements for depot
level IRAN.
Perhaps the ultimate criterion for judging the performance
of an aircraft maintenance activity, assuming it meets all
of its operational requirements, is its safety record. The
primary Contract Flying Schools had an amazing safety record.
"From the introduction of the first T-37 in 1957 until the
last plane departed the Contract Flying Schools in December
1960, there were no major or minor aircraft accidents assessed
to a primary cause of aircraft maintenance error"
_0/
.
In 19 59 the Air Training Command was requested to reduce
the costs of basic pilot training to a level more comparable
to the primary training costs which were obtained by the
Civilian Contract Flying Schools . In order to obtain current
data on the utilization of contractors for other than primary
pilot training, a services contract was awarded to Serv-Air,
Inc. on 15 July 1960. This contract required Serv-Air to
provide all service functions except for flight instruction
at Vance Air Force Base. These services included such func-
tions as civil engineering and transportation, in addition
to aircraft maintenance and supply support. A description
of the Air Force experiment at Vance is presented in Section
IV of this thesis; however, it is important to note that the
contractor performed all required services to Air Force
23

specifications with 35% fewer personnel than a similar Air
Force Base with an identical mission /16/
.
At present, in addition to utilizing contractor operated
facilities such as Vance AFB and the Air Force Eastern Test
Range where Pan Am Airways has a service contract which in-
volves 30,000 employees at an annual cost of over $100 mil-
lion /TJ , the Air Force uses contractor logistics support
for weapons systems. These weapons systems logistics con-
tracts are of two types: interim contractor support and
permanent contractor support. Interim contractor support is
an alternative to the immediate implementation of in-house
logistic support when receiving a new aircraft into the in-
ventory. The period of interim logistic support varies,
but has averaged about three years . Interim contractor sup-
port has been used successfully on such programs as the
F-4C, C-141, and F-lll and is planned for the F-16 and Ad-
vanced Medium STOL Transport programs fTTJ
.
The Air Force uses permanent contractor support for off-
the-shelf aircraft. The first such contract was awarded
for the C-9A in August 196 7. Under the C-9A contract, the
Air Force performs flight line and on-aircraft maintenance
,
while McDonnell Douglas performs or subcontracts all off-
aircraft maintenance including heavy checks , component re-
pair, and engine overhaul. The contractor also provides
all supply functions /18/ . The Air Force presently has six
permanent contractor support programs: C-12, E-4, C-9A,
T-43, U-18B, and VC-9C /19/ . These programs are all similar
24

to the C-9A program previously described. The Air Force pro-
vides some common supplies for these aircraft, such as tires
and avionics equipment already in the Air Force system. The
Air Force performs organizational and some intermediate level
maintenance, with the remainder of the logistics support pro-
vided by the contractor. According to Mr. David Ellenburg
of the Headquarters AFLC Controller's Office, the Air Force
experience with permanent contractor support of off-the-shelf
aircraft has been successful, and the Air Force plans to
.utilize permanent contractor logistics support in future pro-
grams such as the Advanced Tanker-Cargo Aircraft program
/w .
D. NAVY EXPERIENCE
The Navy's post World War II experience with contractor
aviation logistics support began with contractor maintenance
at the depot level. With a beginning similar to that of the
Air Force, the Navy started with contracting for the depot
maintenance of off-the-shelf transport aircraft. One of the
first extensive depot contracts was with Lockheed Air Ser-
vice for the Navy's fleet of C-121/EC121 (Super Constella-
tion) aircraft during the early 19 50's. The Navy subsequent-
ly has contracted for depot maintenance of other transport
and training aircraft such as: C-117, C-118, C-130, T-29,
T-34, and TS-2A /2Q/ . The Navy has retained a substantial
Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) capability and plans to
continue to share the depot level maintenance workload be-
tween the NARF ' s and contractors.
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The Navy has had significant experience with contractor
material support during the test and evaluation phases of
new aircraft acquisitions. One of the longest such con-
tracts was with McDonnell Aircraft for the F-4B program /21/
This interim materials support program extended over five
years, from May 195 8 to July 19 63. During this period
McDonnell provided materials support for the F-4B at ten
different locations and for as many as 42 aircraft at one
time. Also during this period the aircraft were flow a
total of 18,404 hours. Another example of contractor in-
terim support occurred in the P-3A program /21/ . The Navy's
contract with Lockheed for the P-3A extended from 1 April
1961 to 30 March 1963. During this period Lockheed provided
material support at six different locations with as many as
29 aircraft being supported at one time. Surprisingly, dur-
ing this relatively short period (two years) Lockheed sup-
ported a total of 18,669 flight hours. Lockheed stocked
17,2 80 support items for the P-3A program at a total cost of
$26.0 million, and returned to the Navy a parts inventory
valued at $24.6 million two years later / 2 1/ .
Although the advantages and disadvantages of interim
contractor support will be examined in Section IV, the fol-
lowing quote from a Logistics Management Institute study
provides an indication of the magnitude of possible cost
savings with a contractor material support program during
the early acquisition phases ' 21/ .
Provisioning conferences for the P-3A began during
January and ended during March 1962, some nine months
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in advance of the planned Navy support date. The first
operational flights occurred during June 196 2, and were
supported through the contractor material support pro-
gram. Had the Navy planned to support these first
operational flights organically, initial provisioning
decisions would have had to be made beginning, at the
latest, in July 1961. Had this provisioning schedule
been used, some additional 3,500 design changes would
have impacted upon the early provisioning decisions.
Thus, the full impact of these changes was avoided by
provisioning some six to nine months later.
In 19 6 6 the Navy awarded its first contract for extended
contractor aviation logistics support / 2 2/ . The Navy had
purchased a limited number of TC-4-C aircraft which were
specially configured Grumman Gulfstream I aircraft to be
used as electronic trainers for the A-6 weapon system. Since
the acquisition was limited and the airframe was an off-the-
shelf commercial aircraft, the Navy decided to contract with
Grumman to support the engine and airframe, while the Navy
supported the peculiar avionics equipment. In addition,
the contract specified that Grumman would supply all Tech-
nical Publications to Navy specifications. The TC-M-C
logistics support program was difficult to administer for
two primary reasons /~2 2/ . First, there was not a clear inter-
face between the airframe and the avionics equipment which
made dividing the Navy/Grumman support responsibility diffi-
cult. Secondly, maintaining the Technical Publications
current became increasingly difficult because they were not
under the Navy Technical Publications system, nor were they
administered as FAA publications . Although there were prob-
lems with this first extended contractor logistics support
contract, important lessons were learned, and the Navy was
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assured that contractors could provide extended logistics
support for off-the-shelf aircraft in a Navy environment.
Based upon the experience with the TC-M-C program, in
1967 the Navy contracted for logistics support of the CT-
3 9E/G aircraft with Rockwell International Corporation /2 3/ .
The CT-39E/G is an off-the-shelf Navy version of the Rockwell
International Corporation Model 265-40/60 Sabreliner. Unlike
the TC-M-C aircraft which included an extensive Navy avionics
package, the Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) in the
CT-39E/G was limited to a Navy UHF and TACAN. The logistics
support concept employed in the CT-39E/G contract required
the Navy to perform organizational maintenance, and Rockwell
to perform intermediate and depot level maintenance and all
supply support. The contract further stipulated that all
contractor maintenance and supply support be conducted in
accordance with approved FAA regulations. As part of the
contract, Rockwell was required to set up and operate an on-
site storeroom at each operating base. The procedures for
obtaining parts support, or repair of reparables , involved
turning in the worn part to the contractor's on-site store-
room in exchange for a new part or RFI component. Unlike
most service contracts, the CT-39E/G contract avoided over-
specifying work standards, for example, the Work Standards
section of the Operational Logistics Support Plan (OLSP)
states fTTJ :
All depot level work including repair of reparables
engine overhaul and repair, the Annual Airworthiness
Inspection and other work performed by the Contractor
must be in accordance with appropriate Federal Air
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Regulations. Materials issued in support of all mainten-
ance levels must be from FAA-approved stock.
Again, learning from the TC-4C experience, the contract
limited the Navy's responsibility for Technical Publications
to providing the NATOPS Manual and Checklists, Maintenance
Requirement Cards, and UHF and TACAN Technical Manuals. All
the remaining publications were standard Commercial Technical
Manuals provided by the contractor and available to Navy
personnel at the on-site storeroom. Although the Navy owned
no spares or repair parts, all peculiar Ground Support Equip-
ment (GSE) was purchased by the Navy. According to the con-
tract, Rockwell was compensated for materials support monthly
by submitting reports which detailed material demands placed
with the on-site storeroom. The reports included each line
item and whether it was a consumable or reparable. Consumables
were compensated at a fixed price and reparables were com-
pensated at a fixed price of 50% of component cost. For
depot level maintenance such as the Airworthiness Inspection,
the contractor was compensated on the basis of a fixed price
per man hour and for the materials used. The Airworthiness
Inspection was in effect an IRAN and replaced the usual Navy
PDLM (Periodic Depot-Level Maintenance). The CT-39E/G
logistics support contract was easier to administer than the
earlier TC-4C contract and formed the basis for future avia-
tion logistics support contracts in the Navy 7 2 2/ .
On 31 January 196 8, the Navy contracted with Bell Heli-
copter Company for delivery of M-0 TH-5 7A helicopters with
an option to purchase an additional 25 at a later date / 2*4/ .
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The contract also provided for total contractor material sup-
port for the lifetime of the aircraft and represents the
largest contractor aviation logistics support operation in
the Navy today. The TH-5 7A is an off-the-shelf FAA certified
Bell Model 20 6A JetRanger helicopter which is used in the
Navy's undergraduate helicopter training program. At the
time the contract was initiated, the TH-5 7A was based at NAS
Ellison Field, Pensacola, Florida. The TH-57A training pro-
gram has subsequently been moved to NAS Whiting Field,
Milton, Florida where it is currently in operation. As in
the CT-39E/G program, the TH-57A contract required the Navy
to provide organizational maintenance, and Bell to provide
intermediate and depot level maintenance, plus supply sup-
port. Although the CT-39E/G and the TH-5 7A support contracts
were similar, there were several significant differences in
the latter contract. First, the method of compensating Bell
for repair of reparables was different. Each part was
guaranteed by Bell for a specified number of operating hours.
When a part failed, the number of actual operating hours
prior to failure were compared with the certified time be-
tween overhauls (TBO) guaranteed by Bell. If the part
failed prior to the certified TBO, the following formula was
used to calculate the cost of a replacement part to the
Navy /T57 .
Cost of Part = Actual Operating Hours 0verhaul PriceBell Certified TBO
The second major change was the incorporation of a penal-
ty clause for late delivery of required parts . The contract
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required Bell to furnish parts causing NORS-G (Non-Opera-
tional Ready Supply, Grounding), replaceable within the Navy
organizational maintenance level within 24 hours of presen-
tation of a DD form 1348 /25 / . Items not causing a NORS-G
condition replaceable within the capabilities of Navy organi-
zational level maintenance were required to be furnished by
the contractor within 15 days . A final difference from the
CT-39E/G support contract was in the area of GSE. In the
CT-39E/G contract the Navy purchased all peculiar GSE, where-
as intheTH-57A contract Bell supplied and maintained all
GSE not common to the Navy. The present TH-57A logistics sup-
port operation has changed slightly from the original con-
tract and is working to the complete satisfaction of the
Navy operators of the TH-57A as evidenced by the following
synopsis of an interview with LCDR Paul Wilkes, HT-3 Mainten-
ance Officer /2 6/ .
The present TH-5 7A support contract is with Bell
Textron and includes total supply support, repair of
reparables , and intermediate and depot level mainten-
ance beyond the capability of the HT-8 Maintenance
Department. A change to the contract within the past
year allows the Squadron to perform some intermediate
and depot level maintenance under the supervision of
Bell Techreps. Crash damage or other unusual mainten-
ance problems are referred to the TH-5 7A Program Mana-
ger at the Naval Air Logistics Center at NAS Patuxent
River for final disposition.
Bell's supply support is excellent and has enabled
the Squadron to maintain a NORS rate of approximately
0.7%. The Bell personnel work hard to keep the air-
craft up, and they get along well with the Navy main-
tenance personnel. The contract is relatively easy to
work with and no unusual problems are being experienced.
In May 1973, the Navy received the first of 12 C-9B
aircraft purchased from McDonnell-Douglas under a contract

that included extended contractor logistics support . Also
an off-the-shelf aircraft, the C-9B is a Navy version of
the McDonnell-Douglas DC-9. The C-9B support contract is
very similar to the TH-5 7A contract. Under the terms of
the C-9B contract, the Navy is responsible for organization-
al level maintenance and McDonnell-Douglas is responsible
for all supply support and for intermediate and depot level
maintenance. The supply support is provided by the contrac-
tor for a fixed price adjusted for flight utilization. The
contract has a penalty clause for late delivery of parts.
The parts are divided into three categories, and the time
requirements vary from 3 minutes for a category A part, to
6 days for category C parts. The remainder of the logis-
tics support is the same as in the TH-57A contract except
that the C-9B contractor is required to furnish parts world-
wide. According to CDR T. H. Hite, VR-1 Maintenance Officer
"Utilizing the contractor for logistics support is extremely
effective. The contractor provides 24 hour service each
day except for Christmas, and supports the aircraft world-
wide. The McDonnell-Douglas personnel are easy to work with
and because of them the C-9B Operational Readiness and NORS
rates have been excellent /"2 7/ . " As an example of the
quality of the maintenance/material support provided by the
contractor, in conjunction with the professionalism of the
VR-1 Maintenance Department, during the month of August 19 7 7
the Squadron averaged 146.4 flight hours per aircraft while
maintaining a 94.3% Operationally Ready rate and a MORS rate
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of 0.1% / 2 8/ . This achievement was not unusual for VR-1,
as their previous 12 month Operational Readiness averaged
87.4-%. This kind of performance speaks for itself, the
Navy/ Contractor partnership in aviation logistics support
works I
In April 1977, the Navy received the first T-UUA of a
planned 66 aircraft buy. The T-M-4-A is another Navy pur-
chase of a commercial off-the-shelf aircraft, in this case
the Beech Kingair E-90. The advent of the T-4M-A ushers in
a completely new concept in Naval Aviation: total contractor
aviation logistics support. Under the terms of the T-^M-A
contract, Beech provides organizational maintenance, as well
as intermediate maintenance, depot maintenance, and total
supply support. Because of the importance of this contract
to the purpose of this thesis, the T-44-A acquisition and
logistics support contract are covered in-depth in Section
III.
The Navy plans to expand industry participation in avia-
tion logistics support. The Navy presently has a contract
with Beech for total contractor logistics support of the
T-34C aircraft which will be introduced in the Naval Air
Training Command in the near future /2 2/ . The Navy also
plans to utilize total contractor logistics support in the
CTX acquisition planned for the 1980-1982 time frame /29/ .
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The Navy conducts all advanced phase multi-engine
pilot training at Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas.
There are three echelons of command within the Naval Air
Training organization located at NAS Corpus Christi: the
Chief of Naval Air Training Headquarters ; Training Air Wing
Four Headquarters; and on the same organizational level,
the Naval Air Station Corpus Christi and Training Squadrons
27, 28, and 31. The organizational relationships within
the Naval Air Training Command pertaining to multi-engine
pilot training are shown in Figure 1. The Naval Air Station





























Training Department conducts the ground training and Train-
ing Squadrons 2 8 and 31 perform the flight training for the
multi-engine pilot syllabus. The overall supervision and
coordination of multi-engine pilot training is the responsi-
bility of the Commander, Training Air Wing Four.
Until 1977 all advanced phase multi-engine pilot
training was conducted in the TS-2A, a twin reciprocating
engine, non-pressurized, trainer aircraft. The average
TS-2A has been in service since 1955, is on its tenth service
tour, and is one of the most expensive training command air-
craft to operate and support / 30/ . Its reciprocating engines
limit the training envelope to 10,000' and below. In addi-
tion, the TS-2A offers no turbine .engine operator training
to flight students that will, upon graduation, report to
squadrons flying turbine powered aircraft. The advanced age
and obsolescence of the TS-2A coupled with the established
requirement for continued training of undergraduate multi-
engine pilots established the need for a replacement multi-
engine advanced trainer aircraft, the VTAM(X).
Based upon the successes experienced with partial
contractor logistics support, especially with the TH-57A pro-
gram, and anticipating further manpower reductions for the
shore establishment, the Chief of Naval Operations directed
that a study be conducted concerning the feasibility of total
contractor logistics support for the VTAM(X) . In late 1974,
The Institute for Management Science and Engineering of
George Washington University began to study this problem
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under the auspices of the Office of Naval Research. The
study, which was completed in March 197 5, concluded that
total contractor logistics support for the VTAM(X) was
feasible, cost effective, and had no over-riding disadvan-
tages /TDV .
2. The VTAM(X) Request for Proposal (RFP)
a. Program Characteristics
The program characteristics for the VTAM(X)
were established by the Chief of Naval Operations as
follows
:
Cost - Minimize life cycle cost by purchasing
available hardware, and by maximum utilization of contrac-
tor logistics support.
Performance - Accept state-of-the-art commer-
cial aircraft specifications tailored to Navy needs.
Schedule - Plan acquisition to accept the first
VTAM(X) aircraft in FY 197 7.
b. Acquisition Strategy
Utilizing the Chief of Naval Operation's VTAM(X)
program characteristics, the Naval Air Systems Command de-
veloped an acquisition strategy based on a new concept in
Naval Aviation, a "turn key" operation of aircraft by the
Navy. The major thrust of this strategy was a "total package
procurement" in a competitive environment involving three
option lots of aircraft at a firm fixed price, and a five
year support package where the firm fixed price deliverables
36

(.flight hours) relate to real world needs. This totally
new acquisition strategy included:
( 1) Buying an Off-the-Shelf Commerical Aircraft ,
Purchasing a commercially available aircraft would result
in avoiding a five to six year development program thereby
minimizing the schedule while at the same time saving
millions of dollars in RSD, production, and life cycle sup-
port costs which would be inevitable when developing a new
military aircraft. In addition, the stated performance
requirements for the VTAM(X) were amply met by the following
commercial aircraft already in production and commercial use
in 1975:
Manufacturer Aircraft
Beech Aircraft Kingair E 9 and C-12
Cessna Citation
Piper Cheyenne PA31T
Rockwell Rockwell 6 9 0A
Mitsubishi MU-2
Swearingen Merlin III
Another major advantage of buying an off-the-shelf aircraft
is that the competitive commercial aircraft environment
coupled with the ability to specifically define the produc-
tion unit enabled the Navy to structure the RFP on a firm
fixed price basis. Page 1 of the VTAM(X) Type Description,
as shown in Appendix B, contains the General Type Descrip-
tion of the aircraft. The Navy avoided overly detailed
specifications in the RFP, for example, in paragraph A.l.a.
of the VTAM(X) Type Description the Navy left the option
open for either a turbo prop or a pure jet aircraft. This
policy of avoiding over specifying requirements was
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consistent throughout the entire RFP thereby allowing for
maximum competition among the commercial aircraft manufac-
turers .
(2) Total Contractor Logistics Support . Build-
ing on the Navy's previous experience with limited contrac-
tor logistics support, a plan was developed for the VTAM(X)
that would depend on a partnership with industry for total
life cycle logistics support. This approach involved con-
tractor investment in support equipment and parts inventories,
and the establishment of a contractor service center at NAS
Corpus Christi.
Prior Navy contract support programs in
naval aviation had been limited to: (1) depot maintenance
of Navy aircraft using detailed work specifications and
government materials; and (2) augmenting Navy-performed
organizational maintenance with commercial intermediate/depot
maintenance and support services . With the exception of the
TH-5 7A, the contractor augmented support in naval aviation
typically applied to small lots of off-the-shelf aircraft
dispersed at several bases. The logic behind selecting con-
tractor support in these cases is best summarized by the
following quote from a NAVAIRSYSCOM point paper; "Underlying
theory held that numerous counterpart aircraft, operating in
commercial aviation, were supported by a viable network of
manufacturers, dealers and service facilities, and that par-
ticipating in the commercial system was better than duplicat-
ing it" / 2 9/ . The planned VTAM(X) program was similar to the
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TH-57A program in that both programs involved relatively-
large numbers of off-the-shelf aircraft operating from one
base in a controlled mission environment (training) . Build-
ing on the success of the contractor support experienced in
the TH-57A program, the Navy took the next logical step
forward and decided on the concept of total contractor logis-
tics support for the VTAM(X) program. This new concept
included:
Maintenance according to commercial standards and prac-
tices .
Commercial spare and repair parts
.
Commercial support equipment, publications, and training
Commercial depot support of airframes , engines , and
components
.
Commercial organizational and intermediate maintenance.
Figure 2 provides guidance for support con-
tract design and was used as a model for constructing the
maintenance/materials support section of the VTAM(X) RFP
.
The RFP was designed to have the contractor provide all main-
tenance and supporting logistics elements under a long term,
firm fixed price agreement. Appendix C shows that portion
of the VTAM(X) RFP relating to the scope of maintenance/
materials support. As can be seen in Appendix C, the Navy
avoided overly detailed specifications and relied on normal
approved FAA commercial maintenance procedures
.
c. The Approved RFP
The Navy's decision to avoid overly detailed
specifications and the use of government materials by
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GUIDANCE IN SUPPORT CONTRACT DESIGN
1. Maximize contractor responsibility.
2. Avoid split responsibility. A narrow line can easily
become a grey area.
3. Rely on commercial standards, specifications and
materials
.
4. Insist on contractor investment. It increases his
stake in the ultimate success (or failure) of the
program.
5. Avoid unnecessary paperwork, especially routine printed
reports. When necessary, make the paper serve two or
more purposes. For example, an invoicing system that
doubles as a performance status report.
6. Risk: assign high probability risk, other than very
high cost items; reserve low or unknown probability
risk, such as crash damage repair.
7. Define performance clearly in terms of what is expected,
but not how to do the job. Avoid guidance which
relieves the contractor from near total responsibility
for the design and management of his approach to meet-
ing the need.
8. Use penalties as a device for getting management's
attention; not to bankrupt a company.
9. Use incentives to reward performance beyond what is
normally expected; not to reward capacity to expand
production.
Source: Naval Air Systems Command Point Paper, Total
Contractor Logistics Support , by J. P. Mulligan,




relying on existing commercial systems in the VTAM(X) RFP
was in consonance with the Federal Government's acquisition
policy as stated by the Director of the Office of Federal
Procurement policy (OFPP) /~31/ :
The Government will purchase commercial, off-the-shelf
products when such products will adequately serve the
Government's requirements, provided such products have an
established commercial market acceptability. The Govern-
ment will utilize commercial distribution channels in
supplying commercial products to its users.
The design of the VTAM(X) RFP was based on the
lessons learned from previous aviation logistics support
contracts. That previous experience had yielded the set of
principles listed in Figure 2. These principles had guided
the contract design process which resulted in a proposal
request that was a clear statement of the Navy's needs in
terms compatible with industry practice. The VTAM(X) RFP
was approved on November 24- , 1975 and mailed to eight com-
mercial aircraft manufacturers. The success of the RFP was
demonstrated by the absence of requests for clarification
after the RFP was issued and by the overall responsiveness
of the proposals received by the Navy / 29/ .
3. The T-44A Contract
On May 25, 19 7 6 the VTAM(X) contract was awarded to
the Beech Aircraft Corporation, and the program's designa-
tion was changed from VTAM(X) to T-44A /32/ . The contract
specified an initial buy of 15 T-44A aircraft, with options
to purchase 51 additional aircraft at a fixed price of
$511,206 each. The contract further specified total logis-
tics support by Beech from the receipt of the first
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operational T-M-4-A at NAS Corpus Christi in April 1977, until
the expiration of the contract on September 30, 1981. The
logistics support section of the contract also specified a
firm fixed price whereby the Navy pays Beech $92.61 per hour
for the first 6 5 flight hours per aircraft each month, and
$41.80 for each additional hour. The contract provided for
incentives for the contractor if aircraft sorties exceeded
an average of 0.4- per aircraft on flyable days, and for
penalties if the average monthly operational readiness of
all aircraft was less than 0.80. The contract also contained
an inflation clause.
B. T-4 4-A OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN
The T-44A Operational Logistics Support Plan (OSLP No.
AC04-9) was published in its present format on 18 March 1977
/ 33/ , and represents a totally new concept in naval aviation.
The total contractor support concept embodied in the T-4-4A
OSLP provides the Navy with its first "turn key" operation
of aircraft. The five major logistics elements (maintenance,
supply, training, publications, and GSE) are the contractor's
responsibility. The Navy provides some facilities, the
NATOPS manual and checklist, and flies the aircraft. Al-
though this description of the T-M-4A operation sounds sim-
plistic, it is nevertheless the essence of the program.
Because of the importance of this first test case of total
contractor logistics support in the Navy, the major provi-
sions of the OSLP will be discussed in detail.
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1. On-Site Support Center (OSC)
The contractor service center located at NAS Corpus
Christi has been designated an On-Site Support Center (OSC).
All aircraft maintenance and related support activities for
the T-M-4A are performed under the auspices of the OSC. The
functions of the OSC equate to a combination of organiza-
tional, intermediate and depot maintenance, plus supply
support. The organization and administration of the OSC are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
a. OSC Organization
The OSC organization is depicted in Figure 3.
As Beech Aircraft Corporation's key on-site representative,
the OSC manager bears total responsibility for all functions
that constitute the T-44-A support program. In cooperation
with the On-Site Support Center Liaison Officer (OSCLO),
he coordinates the OSC's efforts to totally support the
flying hour program. Although the OSC provides flyable air-
craft to Training Squadrons 2 3 and 31, the OSCLO does not
report to the squadron commanders , but rather to the Com-
mander, Training Air Wing Four (CTW-4). The OSCLO is re-
sponsible to CTW-4 for a smooth interface between the Navy
and the OSC, and for settling minor disputes. Problems of
a greater degree are forwarded to the Administrative Contract-
ing Officer (ACO) for resolution. The OSCLO designates and
promulgates a list of Authorized Government Personnel (AGP)
who are authorized to coordinate services with the OSC
































































functions depicted on the OSC organization chart are similar
to the functions performed in a typical aviation squadron
maintenance department.
It is important to note that the employees in
the OSC are in the employ of the contractor, and are not
employees of the government. The ACO is responsible for
accrediting the contractor's employees to the Navy in accord-
ance with current regulations . As civilian employees on a
Naval Air Station, contractor employees are subject to all
applicable regulations of the Department of the Navy,
b. OSC Working Hours
Most T-4MA flight operations are conducted
Monday through Friday; however, some flights are scheduled
and conducted on weekends . The OSC working hours shown in
Figure 4 are based on average hours of flight operations
OSC WORKING HOURS
DAY FULL SERVICE LIMITED SERVICE ON-CALL
Monday 0600-2330- N/A 2330-0600
through
Friday
Saturday N/A 0800-1600 0001-0800
1600-2t+00
Sunday and N/A 1200-2000 0001-1200
Holidays
_ 2000-2400(except Christmas)
"The hours of full service operation is a seasonal average
and is adjusted as necessary to be compatible with the
seasonal hours of flight operations.




and allow one hour for pre-flight and one hour for post-
flight maintenance/service. Full Service operation includes
all OSC maintenance, supply and administrative services;
however, the degree and tempo of Full Service are not
specified in the OSLP because they will vary. For example,
the need for certain support functions such as personnel
administration and the Technical Library are not constant
during the 0600-2330 duty day. Limited Service is restric-
ted to aircraft servicing (fueling, oiling, nitrogen, oxy-
gen) cleaning, and inspection (pre-flight and post-flight).
On-Call Service refers to non-routine situations such as
flight operations rescheduled because of bad weather. The
contract requires the OSCLO to attempt to provide the con-
tractor with 7 2 hours notice of the requirement for On-Call
Service. The OSC manning level requirement must be agreed
to and documented in advance by the OSCLO because the con-
tractor must be compensated for a minimum of four hours
pay for each employee called in for On-Call Service. The
contractor is not obligated to provide Full or Limited Ser-
vice during any holiday observed by the Naval Air Station,
but is required to follow the On-Call Service procedures
on holidays except for Christmas.
c. Physical Plant and Equipment
The OSC is physically located in hangar 57 at
NAS Corpus Christi. The Navy provides the spaces, utilities,
janitorial services for administrative spaces, and security
for the OSC. The contractor is responsible for policing
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the ramp and adjacent hangar areas. Arrangements have been
made for the Navy to provide ramp sweeping vehicle services
upon the contractor's request. The contractor is also re-
sponsible for normal line division functions such as taxi
directing of aircraft in and out of the flight line, and
securing of aircraft including tie down and other normal air-
craft securing procedures.
The contractor is responsible for furnishing
all ground support equipment (GSE), tools, test equipment,
office equipment and communications equipment required to
support all functions performed by the OSC. Upon expira-
tion of the contract, the ownership of all tools and equip-
ment furnished by the contractor will be transferred to the
Government.
d. Technical Library
The contractor was required to establish and
must maintain current at the OSC a Technical Library of
all T-4-4A publications to include: operations and mainten-
ance manuals for aircraft, engines, installed equipment,
components and contractor furnished GSE; and technical
directives including FAA Airworthiness Directives, Manufac-
turer's Service Bulletins/Letters/Instructions , and NAVAIR
Technical Directives. Navy personnel are granted access to
the OSC Technical Library when required.
e. Record Keeping and Reporting
The contractor is required to maintain records
of maintenance actions to aircraft, installed equipment and
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components in accordance with FAA requirements appropriate
to an FAA Certified Repair Station. The maintenance records
must be made available to personnel designated by the OSCLO
and the cognizant squadron commanders.
OSC reporting requirements to CTW-4 are as
follows
:
Daily . On occurrence during each flying day,
a report is submitted to reflect changes in aircraft status
with respect to Operational Readiness. In the event of a
disagreement between a squadron and the OSC related to the
readiness status of an aircraft, a final and binding deci-
sion will be made by the OSCLO.
Weekly . Report the projected number of opera-
tionally ready aircraft for the following week. This re-
port is utilized by Training Air Wing Four activities to
prepare the weekly and daily flight schedules.
Monthly . Report the projected number of opera-
tionally ready aircraft for the following month. This
report is utilized by Training Air Wing Four activities for
long range planning.
Special . In the event the Navy identifies an
adverse NORM or MORS trend, or a repetitive malfunction
causing flight emergency/abort, the OSCLO must request of
the contractor a special report on the cause thereof, and
a get-well plan.
2 . Maintenance
The normal functions of organizational, intermediate
and depot maintenance are combined in the T-4-4A OSLP into
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Squadron Maintenance and Conditional Maintenance. Squadron
Maintenance consists of those maintenance functions and pro-
cedures performed on a recurring basis at a firm fixed price
Conditional Maintenance consists of those maintenance func-
tions and procedures whose cost/risk/volume factors do not
lend themselves to firm fixed pricing. For example, crash
damage comes under Conditional Maintenance in the contract.












































the type maintenance/costing associated with each element.
Conditional Maintenance costing (provisional) is computed




Squadron Maintenance can be performed on-site or
off-site. On-site Squadron Maintenance refers to aircraft
maintenance and servicing performed at NAS Corpus Christi
and outlying fields in the Corpus Christi Training Complex,
including: NALF ' s Cabiness and Waldron, OLF Orange Grove,
NAS ' s Kingsville and Chase Field and Corpus Christi Inter-
national Airport. Although the majority of T-M-M-A multi-
engine training is performed within the Corpus Christi
Training Complex, the syllabus does require cross-country
training which established the need for off-site Squadron
Maintenance. Off-site Squadron Maintenance is aircraft
maintenance, exclusive of aircraft servicing, to an aircraft
downed off-site because of a requirement for maintenance
which would otherwise be considered Squadron Maintenance.
The procedures for repairing an aircraft off-site are
simple. The pilot notifies his squadron of the nature of
the discrepancy and the aircraft's location. The informa-
tion is passed to the OSC which may either: (1) arrange
for a vendor such as a local Fixed Base Operator to perform
the required maintenance, or (2) dispatch a maintenance
team and supplies to perform the required maintenance. The
aircraft downed off-site remains in an excusable delay sta-
tus until the vendor begins to work on the aircraft or the
contractor's maintenance team arrives at the aircraft. The
government has the choice of providing transportation or
reimbursing the contractor for commercial transportation if
the contractor decides to dispatch a maintenance team. In
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addition, the government is obligated to pay a fixed rate
of per diem for the contractor's maintenance team.
3 . Supply
The normal functions of aviation supply for the
T-M-4A are accomplished by the contractor under a provision
of the OSLP termed Squadron Materials. The Squadron Mater-
ials section of the OSLP requires the contractor to provide
all materials required in performing Squadron Maintenance,





Bench Stock (common aircraft hardware)
Bar Stock
Aircraft Engine Oil
Peculiar Fluids and Lubricants
Aircraft Cleaning Materials
Materials Required to Support GSE
The only materials the Navy supplies are fuel for maintenance
and flight operations, and fuel for the GSE.
The OLSP requires the contractor to maintain an ade-
quate inventory of all of the above materials . The inven-
tory must be sufficient in range and depth to support both
the T-M-M-A and GSE operations. The required materials are
divided into two groups by value and usage. Category I
materials are low and high usage, low value materials; Cate-
gory II materials are low usage, high value materials.
Category I materials must be stored at the OSC, whereas
Category II materials may be stored at a place designated
by the contractor. The contractor is further required to
keep adequate inventory records of all storeroom transactions,
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The ACO or his representative have access to the contrac-
tor's Squadron Materials records.
4-
. Training
Training of the initial cadre of Navy pilots was
accomplished by the contractor at NAS Corpus Christi. Ini-
tial training for a cadre of Navy ground school instructors
and the CTW-4 Maintenance Performance Monitoring Team was
conducted at Beech's Wichita facility. Corrosion control
training of contractor personnel is provided by the Navy
CNAMTD 1004) at NAS Chase Field, Texas. All further train-
ing of Navy pilots and ground personnel, and all training




The contractor is responsible for providing and
maintaining all maintenance publications in a Technical
Library at the OSC. All operations and maintenance manuals
for the aircraft and GSE are standard commercial type pub-
lications. The Navy is responsible for providing the
NATOPS manual and checklist.
6 Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
The contractor is responsible for providing and
maintaining all required GSE. Upon termination of the con-
tract in October 1981, the ownership of all GSE will be
transferred to the government.
7 Navy Responsibilities
The Navy's support responsibilities for the T-44A
are relatively minimal. In addition to providing the con-
tractor with space and utilities, the Navy provides:
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Recovery of aircraft downed as a result of crash
damage
.
Support and maintenance of pilot personnel pro-
tective equipment.
Maintenance and on-call sweeping of the ramp.
Fuel, oxygen, nitrogen, tie-downs, fire bottles,
and chocks
.
Servicing of aircraft on cross-country flights,
including required inspections (pre-flight and
post-flight)
.
Functional check flight crews
.
In addition to the responsibilities listed above, the Navy
maintains a maintenance monitoring program at Training Air
Wing Four Headquarters . The Maintenance Monitoring Team
is coordinated by an aviation warrant officer and consists
of five enlisted maintenance monitors and two enlisted data
analysis personnel. Since over-the-shoulder or add-on
quality assurance actions by the Navy are not part of the
maintenance program, the Maintenance Monitoring Team's re-
sponsibilities are limited to evaluating support effective-
ness by means of end item checks, maintenance performance
monitoring, aircraft status checks, and report reviews.
C. T-44 EXPERIENCE TO DATE
The first operational T-44A was delivered to the Navy
at NAS Corpus Christi, on schedule, in April 1977. From that
date until the writing of this paper (October 1977), a total
of ten T-M-4A aircraft have been delivered and are all being
actively utilized in multi-engine pilot training. Inter-
views with various key personnel at NAS Corpus Christi

indicate that the T-44A program is proceeding extremely
well. Figure 6 shows the maintenance performance statistics
of the T-44A and the TS-2A in the areas of Operationally
Ready (OR), Not Operationally Ready Maintenance (NORM), and
Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) for the three month
period June-August 197 7. The maintenance performance sta-
tistics for the TS-2A were added to Figure 6 as a point of
T-44A/TS-2A MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE





















































Source: Commander Training Air Wing Four Maintenance
Monitoring Team.
Figure 6
reference and not for comparison with the T-44A statistics.
Since all of the T-44A aircraft have been averaging consid-
erably more than the 6 5 hours per month required by the con-
tract, it can be clearly seen that the T-44A is carrying its
share of the flight load and the OSC is performing extremely
well. The supply support provided by the OSC has been suf-
ficient to avoid any loss of Operationally Ready time because
of NORS, and the aircraft have required very little
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maintenance down time, resulting in an average Operationally
Ready figure of 99.33% for the three month period, well
above the 80.0% required by the contract.
There have been other beneficial fallouts of the T-^UA
program. For example, thus far there have not been any T-44A
ground aborts because of non-availability or mechanical
failure, and the T-44A turnaround time has averaged 30%
less than TS-2A turnaround time /34/ . The only requirement
for Conditional Maintenance thus far was because of a bird
strike. In this case the contractor repaired the aircraft
in a timely fashion and at a reasonable cost / 3 5/ . The
OSCLO stated that the relationship between the OSC and the
user activities has been excellent thus far, and there have
been no difficulties with contract interpretation or compli-
ance / 3
6
J Finally, the contractor is satisfied with the
logistics support contract. The OSC Manager stated that
there were no difficulties with the contract and anticipated
that Beech would perform the T-UM-A logistics support to the
Navy's complete satisfaction / 3 7/ .
Although it is too early to make a final judgement on
the T-M-4A program at this time, from the experience with
the program thus far it appears that the Navy has made an
effective acquisition, and that the total contractor logis-




In this section, an analysis is presented of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of total contractor logistics sup-
port of Navy land-based aviation activities. The analysis
will also include other types of contractor support, such as
contractor material support and interim contractor support,




The major advantage of contracting for aviation logis-
tics support services is the possibility for tremendous cost
savings. For example, in a study which compared contract
aircraft maintenance at Vance AFB with Air Force organic air-
craft maintenance at Reese AFB, it was found that during FY
19 74 the Vance Contractor performed the same quantity and
quality of maintenance as the Reese organic organization
while saving the Air Force $2,199,515 /16/ . A breakdown of
the expense elements at Vance and Reese for FY 19 7M- are pre-
sented in Figure 7. Another example of Air Force cost sav-
ings realized with contractor logistics support occurred in
the C-9A program. As part of the C-9A acquisition, the Air
Force contracted with McDonnell-Douglas for all logistics
support, other than organizational maintenance. The Air Force
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REESE AFB - VANCE AFB
FY 19 74 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OPERATING BUDGETS
Expense Element Reese Vance
Military Personnel $5,148,500 175,000
Civilian Personnel 1,806,930 -0-
Travel and Utilities 2,100 300
Service Contracts 6,085 4,743,000
Supply Expenditures 1,931,700 1,777,000
TOTALS $8,895,315 $6,695,800
Source: U.S. Air Force Report WN-9443-PR, April 1976.
Figure 7
Logistics Command estimates that the C-9A logistics support
contract saved the Air Force $7.68 million in initial spares
and $8.74 million in recurring organic support over the
first five years of the program /l8/ . Figure 8 provides a
breakdown of the estimated C-9A contract and organic support
costs. In a study by Daniel N. Mealy which compared total
contractor logistics support with Navy organic support for
the VTAM(X), he estimated that total contractor support would
result in a savings of $13.95 million in nonrecurring costs
and $7.30 million per year in recurring costs. These savings
were calculated based upon the estimated Navy costs of pro-
viding the required logistics support for the VTAM(X) com-
pared to representative contractor prices for comparable ser-
vices. Figure 9 provides a breakdown of the estimated VTAM(X)
contract support prices and organic support costs. A final
example of cost savings by contracting for aviation logistics
support is presented in a study by D. Wieland and W. Wilkinson
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C-9A SUPPORT CONCEPT ESTIMATED COST COMPARISON 1
Support Dollars (Millions)
Cost Element Contract Organic
Investment Costs
Spares -0- 7.68
Initial GSE/Spares 0.173 -0-
On-board Spare Kits 0.432 -0-
Aircraft Heavy Maintenance 2.050 2.050
Contract/Air Force Management
Administrative 8 Incentives 1.973 0.184
Technical Representatives 0.280 0.127
Recurring
Supply and Maintenance 9.16 7 20.45 3
Manpower 4.696 4.696
Total 5-Year program cost 18.771 35.190
1967 escalated dollars (millions) for first 5 years of
operations
.
Source: Air Force Logistics Command, C-9A Cost Study,
April 30, 1969.
Figure 8
/3 8/ . They estimate that total contractor logistics support
in the T-34C program will net the Navy a 50% cost savings
when compared to traditional Navy support.
The primary reason that contractors are able to pro-
vide military activities with aviation logistics support at
less cost than providing these functions in-house is because
of substantially higher military personnel costs. There are
several reasons why military personnel costs are higher than
a contractor's personnel costs for accomplishing a given
aviation logistic function.
First, a contractor obtains more direct labor work
hours from his personnel per month than a military commander
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VTAM(X) ESTIMATED COST/PRICE COMPARISON 1
NAVY (cost) CONTRACTOR (price)










Technical Reps. 270 45
Provisioning 8 ,519 1,500
Training 946 200
3M S Supply Data 284
















TOTALS 14,292 14,943 337.5 7,721.6
1Constant 19 75 dollars (thousands)
Source: George Washington University Technical Memorandum




obtains from his personnel. The contractor's personnel have
only one job, that of performing the assigned logistics sup-
port function, whereas the military commander must provide
his military personnel time from their normal work week for
military functions such as: military watches, general mili-
tary training, in-rate training, inspections, physical train-
ing, sick call, special liberty, etc. In addition, contrac-
tor personnel have fewer legal holidays and less annual leave/
sick leave than military and civil service personnel. Esti-
mates of this personnel availability advantage enjoyed by
the contractor range from 9% for military personnel /16/ to
20% for civil service personnel /6~7.
Second, indirect contractor costs for support of per-
sonnel are much lower than military support personnel costs.
"A recent OSD study estimates Navy indirect support at 30% of
direct personnel costs. This "support tail" represents the
people needed to house, feed, pay, maintain discipline and
provide for the amenities of base support of military popula-
tions. Avoidance of these indirect personnel costs provides
the Navy most of the "margin of profit" between contractor
and Navy support of an essentially fixed base operation 7 3 8/ .
"
Third, the military requirement for on-the-job and
formal training is much greater than for contractors. The
contractor has the option of hiring personnel with the desired
skills and level of experience, i.e. licensed FAA mechanics,
whereas the military commander must accept the personnel
ordered into his command whether or nor they are specifically
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trained for the command's logistics functions. The military
commander's training requirements are also greatly increased
by the military's rotation policies. Returning to the com-
parison of contractor support at Vance AFB with organic sup-
port at Reese AFB, it was discovered that the contractor at
Vance was performing all logistics support services with 5 76
people, while Reese had a staff of 887 to perform essential-
ly the same functions. A large portion of this disparity
(38%) was attributable to training requirements. Reese had
16 8 apprentices on board, while the contractor at Vance had
only 50 personnel at the helper level /16/ .
Fourth, military organizations encourage promoting
their best performers into supervisory, hands-off positions,
whereas contractors reward good performance with good pay
and in general have few hands-off supervisors.
Finally, the contractor has the option to hire part-
time workers , to pay overtime during peak work load periods,
and to lay off workers during slack periods. The military
personnel systems are not responsive to cyclical variances
in work loads, therefore the military commander is staffed
for the average work load which results in being under
staffed during peak work load periods and over staffed dur-
ing slack periods. Figure 10 is a breakdown showing the
utilization of the additional 311 military personnel at
Reese AFB. It provides a good example of the general person-
nel advantages of contractors.
A final example of the contractors ' advantage in the
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Source: U. S. Air Force Report WN-9443-PR, April 1976.
Figure 10
Daniel Mealy estimated that organic support of 75 VTAM(X)
aircraft would require 4-56 direct and indirect Navy personnel
/ 3 0/ , whereas Beech estimates that a total work force of 89
will be required to support 66 T-44A aircraft /3 7/ .
Another major economic advantage of contracting for
aviation logistics support is the avoidance of program start-
up costs, such as initial spares inventory, bench and test
equipment, and GSE costs. The Air Force estimated that a
savings of $7.0 million was achieved by requiring the contrac-
tor to stockpile spares as part of the C-9A logistics support
contract / 1 3/ . It is estimated that the Navy saved $13.9
million in start-up costs in the T-44A program / 3 / as a re-
sult of total contractor logistics support. Start-up cost
savings, or at least cost deferrals, have been realized in
other Navy logistics support contracts that were short of
total contractor logistics support. For example, program
start-up costs were saved in the CT-39E/G, Th-57A and C-9B
programs, and start-up costs of $16.0 million were deferred
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for two years in the P-3A interim contractor support program
/21/ o There are several major reasons why contractor mate-
rial support, at least during the first few years of a new
program, results in substantial savings.
It allows the design of the new aircraft to become
. stable prior to provisioning for organic support, thus
delaying the provisioning decision to a more logical
and cost-effective date /17/ .
It permits provisioning based on usage data instead
of mathematical models. It has been estimated that in
some cases where provisioning was accomplished without
usage data, up to 80% of the line items stocked did not
have s tock issues during the first two years of opera-
tion JTT[ ,
Contractor material support programs during the first
few years of a new aircraft's operation result in higher
availability than could be accomplished through organic
support /21/ .
Contractor material support programs save the costs
of entering parts into the Federal Stock System and the
carrying cos ts of maintaining the parts in stock once
entered / 3 8/ .
2. Flexibility
Contracting for aviation logistics support services
provides the Navy with additional flexibility not possible
with these services accomplished in-house. Given that
changes to the operational requirements of the Navy's land-
based aviation community are a certainty, it is easy to see
that contracting for a portion of the aviation logistics
support requirements will provide the Navy with the addi-
tional flexibility required to expand and contract its
logistics support effort to meet peaks and valleys inherent
in an operational requirements curve. According to Wieland




The contractor also offers some advantage in his
ability to respond more rapidly than the Navy can to
changes in the work force requirement. Navy personnel
practices are of necessity more cumbersome than those
of industry. The Navy must operate within a finite
and legally constrained end strength. There is no pool
of talent to draw from and constraints on funds for
moving people cause delay of substantial proportions in
relocating them in response to changing priorities.
Inertia in the Navy personnel system results in delay
in obtaining trained people on-site to meet increased
demands and excess people are retained on-site when the
workload decreases sharply. The contractor has a far
greater ability to hire and fire as needs change. He
can draw from the national labor pool of FAA certified
technicians when needed, and can terminate excess
employees much more rapidly than can government. While
the hire and fire process must be used with discretion,
it does offer an alternative for management of crisis.
The T-44A logistics support plan provides an excellent
example of how flexibility can be built into a logistics
support contract. The T-44-A support contract provides the
Navy with 6 5 flight hours per month per aircraft at a fixed
price. This 6 5 hour figure is averaged over three months
to allow for such factors as student load variance and
weather. The contract also allows for surges in operational
requirements by providing additional flight hours, above
the contracted base of 65, at a fixed price per hour. This
degree of flexibility is impossible to achieve with in-house
logistics support.
Contracting for aviation logistics support also pro-
vides flexibility in the lead time required for establishing
a new program. "Contractors can mobilize work forces with
short notice compared to the time required to recruit, train,
and deploy additional military personnel" /4 0/ . As an
example of how a logistics support contract, when coupled
with an off-the-shelf aircraft purchase, can reduce the lead
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time for establishing a new aircraft program, the T-44A con-
tract was awarded to Beech in May 19 76 and the Navy began
training with the aircraft in April 1977.
3
.
Reduction of the Navy's Manpower Requirements
The mandated reductions in military personnel
strength experienced by the military services following the
Viet Nam War have required the Navy to significantly reduce
the authorized billets and manning levels of the shore
establishment in order to retain proper manning of opera-
tional units . The increased utilization of contractor avia-
tion logistics support in the shore establishment would
allow the continuation of necessary functions, such as flight





The Navy's experience with contractor material and
intermediate/depot maintenance support has been successful
thus far. The Navy has saved money and has benefited by
realizing better NORS and OR rates than could be achieved
with in-house capabilities. During the five years of inter-
im contractor support in the F-4B program, the NORS rate
never exceeded 3.54% per month, while during the first 12
months of Navy organic support the average NORS rate was
13.3% ,/TTJ . In the TH-5 7A program the NORS rate has averaged
less than 1% and the OR rate has averaged approximately 8 0%
/TBT. The Navy's C-9B program has been equally effective,
with a NORS rate averaging less than 1% and a 12 month OR
rate averaging 87.4% / 2 8/ .
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The Navy's only experience with total contractor
logistics support has been with the T-44A program, and thus
far that experience has been totally successful. For the
first three months of operation, the T-44A logistics sup-
port program boasted a remarkable 99.33% OR rate and a per-
fect MORS rate of 0.0%. Although it is too early to form
a final judgement on the T-4 4A logistics support program
at this time, from the experience to date it appears that
the contractor's performance will exceed the Navy's expec-
tations .
B. DISADVANTAGES
1 . Risk to Mission Accomplishment
There are three primary risks to mission accomplish-
ment inherent in an aviation logistics support contract.
The first, and perhaps the most important of these risks,
is the possibility of a strike or other labor disruption
against the contractor. Special no-strike contract clauses
and the Taft-Hartley Act notwithstanding, the possibility
of wildcat strikes, walk-outs and slow-downs pose a very
real threat to mission accomplishment. Concerning the possi-
bility of strikes at Air Force contract support bases, LCOL
Fisher stated: "The possibility of labor disputes was
always recognized by the Air Training Command when plans
were made for training at contract bases. If disputes did
occur, all savings under this type operation would be coun-
teracted. If the incident occurred during an emergency,
the harm would far exceed financial considerations" /12/ .

Realizing the severity of this threat, the Air Training Com-
mand has published plans for emergencies created by strikes
and other labor disruptions to contractor performance / M- / .
Working with the contractor to avoid any possible labor dis-
ruptions before the situation gets serious should be effec-
tive in most cases; however, a well thought out contingency
plan would be invaluable should a strike occur.
The second risk to mission accomplishment is the
possibility of marginal performance by the contractor. For-
tunately, the Navy has not experienced marginal performance
with any of its aviation logistics support contracts to-
date . Most services contracts contain a clause which re-
quires the ACO to notify the contractor of deficient per-
formance, and then the contractor is allowed a reasonable
time to correct the deficiency. It can be easily seen how
this procedure could adversely affect mission accomplish-
ment, as the contractor could "stay one step ahead of the
default clause by correcting each deficiency, but at the
same time additional deficiencies are created" /^O/ . After
the initial award during the acquisition phase, most aviation
logistics support contracts are for one year with the option
to extend the contract for two additional years , if the
contractor's performance is satisfactory. However, even
one year of marginal contractor performance could have ex-
treme adverse effects on mission accomplishment.
The third major risk to mission accomplishment can
occur during the change-over period from the incumbent
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contractor to the new contractor. "The transitional period
(the last month of the incumbent contract period and the
first month of the new one) causes reduced effectiveness
attributable to the need for detailed coordination briefings
of the new personnel and time for familiarization with the
base layout, equipment and personnel" /M-Q/ . Fortunately,
this is a short duration problem that occurs infrequently
because if the incumbent contractor has performed satisfac-
torily the government has the option to extend the contract
two more years. The Navy's experience with aviation logis-
tics support contracts indicates that in addition to per-
forming satisfactorily for the entire three year contract
period, the incumbent contractor normally submits the best
bid and thereby obtains a new contract. As an example,
Bell has retained the TH-57A contract for 10 consecutive
years /26/ .
2 . Loss of Control
Contracting for logistics support services reduces
the Commanding Officer's direct control over the operation.
The Commanding Officer does not have a direct line of
authority to the contractor. If there is a problem with
contract performance, the Commanding Officer must present
his desires to the ACC , who, as the party to the contract in
behalf of the government, is the only legal representative
with authority to negotiate with the contractor. This loss
of absolute control over the logistics support function can
manifest itself in the desire of Navy officials to
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over-inspect the contractor's work. "Unless the temptation
is stifled to build a redundant organization with the Navy
checking on everything the contractor does, substantial
additional expense will occur" 3 8/ . Concerning the tenden-
cy of military officials to over-inspect the work of con-
tractors, Major H. F. Bronson stated /M-l/ ;
There is no difficulty in gaining contractor com-
pliance for those items that are clearly spelled out
in the contract as the contract inspection clause allows
the government to reject services and supplies that do
not conform to contract specifications. The problem
becomes more of one of the contractor expecting the Air
Force Quality Assurance Representative (AFQAR) to per-
form the primary inspection while the contractor gears
his system to react to the AFQAR ' s findings.
Whenever possible, such as when the logistics support con-
tract is for an off-the-shelf commercial aircraft, the work
and inspection specifications should require adherence to
FAA regulations and procedures, and the Navy's quality
assurance program should be limited to normal aircraft
flight line inspections and maintenance trend analysis.
A preliminary base wide education program is required
when a logistics support contract is initiated for the first
time at an installation. Clear lines of authority and
communications with the contractor must be established and
understood by all personnel. Unauthorized orders to con-
tractor personnel can result in serious consequences, such
as relieving the contractor of responsibility for the
actions of his personnel, and obligating the government to
compensate the contractor for unauthorized work performed.
A continuous base wide education program, which should





. Loss of In-House Expertise
Inherent in the process of contracting for aviation
logistics support is the loss of in-house expertise in both
the enlisted and officer communities. This loss is most
evident in the enlisted community, because a total logistics
support contract prohibits any hands-on activity by Navy
personnel. In the T-M-^A program, the only enlisted person-
nel involved with the aircraft are physically located away
from the maintenance hangar and flight line , and their func-
tions are limited to monitoring maintenance performance and
record keeping. Therefore, if at some future date the Navy
should decide to perform T-4M-A maintenance in-house, there
would not be a pool of enlisted personnel with hands-on
maintenance experience to start the program or to train
others
.
The loss of in-house expertise in the officer communi-
ty is not as evident as for the enlisted community, but is
there nevertheless. Using the T-44A program as an example,
the decision to contract for all maintenance support elimi-
nated the maintenance departments in the squadrons affected,
which in turn eliminated many of the traditional ground
billets for the instructor pilots. This loss of maintenance
ground billets affects the officer community two ways.
First, the Junior Officer Flight Instructors are denied the
opportunity to obtain valuable Branch Officer/Division

Officer experience. Second, the Navy will not have a cadre
of experienced officer maintenance personnel should a deci-
sion to change to in-house maintenance be made in the
future
.
There is another related, but ill-defined disadvan-
tage of contractor logistics support when utilized in the
Naval Air Training Command. "Contractor support will also
"civilianize" training operations. The molding of atti-
tudes and perceptions of embryonic Naval Officers which
occurs subtly through personal interactions with officers
and enlisted men of a completely military organization
will be diminished" /38/ .
4-
. Sea-Shore Rotation
Although contracting for total logistics support of
some land-based sea duty and overseas aviation activities
is conceivable, the primary thrust of a contractor logis-
tics support program would occur in the shore establishment
Each services contract awarded to replace a shore establish-
ment logistics support function would reduce the available
enlisted shore duty billets. Since the sea duty and over-
seas aviation activities would not be significantly affec-
ted, the net result would be to change the sea-shore rota-
tion of aviation enlisted personnel in the direction of
more sea duty/overseas duty and less shore duty. Anticipat-
ing the eventual contracting of all aviation logistics
support in the Naval Air Training Command, Wieland and




The price of contractor support will also include
the loss of perhaps M-,000 shore duty billets when con-
tractor support is adopted throughout the Naval Avia-
tion training establishment. While this is a small
percentage of the total aviation personnel structure,
the loss of these "good deal" assignments can only be
perceived by the maintenance people involved as one
more inroad into the attractiveness of a Naval career.
The sea-shore rotation disadvantage is the problem that
will be most difficult to solve. Certainly an all sea duty/
overseas duty assignment enlisted rotation policy is im-
possible. Therefore, the sea-shore rotation morale
effects of each decision to contract for logistics support
must be carefully balanced against the possible advantages
of such contracts. One means of reducing the impact of
this problem is to investigate the feasibility of contract-
ing for logistics support of sea duty, overseas duty, and






The concept of total contractor aviation logistics sup-
port is in consonance with Federal Government policy as pro-
mulgated in 0MB Circular No. A-76. This circular provides
specific guidelines and procedures for implementing the 2 2
year standing policy of the Federal Government to rely, to
the maximum extent, on the private sector for goods and
services
.
The contractor aviation logistics support experiences
of the military services differ considerably, with each
service implementing the policy of A-76 in a different man-
ner. The Army contracts for aviation logistics support at
the base level extensively, particularly at training bases.
The most notable of these support programs is at Fori: Rucker,
where contractors have been providing the Army total contrac-
tor logistics support for the entire aviation training com-
plex satisfactorily since the early 1950 ? s. The Air Force
contracts for aviation logistics support in several differ-
ent ways. In addition to an extensive contractor depot main-
tenance program, the Air Force contracts for total base sup-
port at several facilities, utilizes interim contractor sup-
port for new aircraft programs , and contracts for extended
material and intermediate/depot maintenance support of
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specific aircraft (off-the-shelf commercial aircraft).
The Navy does not contract for total Air Station support,
but does contract for aircraft depot maintenance, interim
support of new aircraft programs, material and intermediate
/depot maintenance support of off-the-shelf commercial air-
craft programs, and in one case (T-M-4A)
,
total contractor
logistics support. Although the experiences of the mili-
tary services with contractor aviation logistics support
differ, they all have reported success with their respec-
tive programs in the areas of economy, manpower savings,
and improved performance
.
The Navy chose the T-M-M-A as its first experience with
total contractor logistics support for two primary reasons.
First, studies that compared Navy organic support with
contractor logistics support of off-the-shelf training
aircraft indicated that substantial cost savings could be
realized with contractor support. Second, Navy successes
with other logistics support contracts, particularly the
TH-57A program, indicated that total contractor support of
a new off-the-shelf training aircraft would be successful
and the next logical step in increasing the Navy's growing
partnership with the aviation industry.
The T-4M-A total contractor logistics support contract
provides the Navy with its first "turn key" operation of
aircraft. With the exception of some ground training, the
five major logistics elements (Maintenance, supply, train-
ing, publications and GSE) are the contractor's responsi-
bility. The contractor physically performs all of these
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functions in an On-Site Support Center located at NAS Corpus
Christi, the operating base. The Navy's responsibilities in
the T-44A program are limited to providing facilities to the
contractor, providing NATOPS Manuals and Checklists, and
flying the aircraft.
The Navy's experience with the T-M-4A logistics support
contract has been totally successful thus far. During the
first three months of operation, the OR rate for the T-4MA
averaged 99.3 3%, and the MORS rate was perfect (0.0%).
The advantages of total contractor aviation logistics
support are: economy from manpower and start-up cost savings,
flexibility in meeting operational requirements, reduced man-
power requirements, and improved performance. The disadvan-
tages are: risk to mission accomplishment from labor dis-
ruptions and marginal contractor performance, loss of control
over logistics functions because the contractor does not
report to the commanding officer, loss of in-house expertise
in both the enlisted and officer communities , and the adverse
morale effects of increasing the length of enlisted aviation
personnel sea duty tours.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The utilization of total contractor logistics support at
selected Naval Aviation shore-based activities is a funda-
mentally sound concepi, and implementation of this concept
should be expanded. The beneficial impacts of the advantages
of total contractor logistics support far outweigh the con-
sequences of the potential disadvantages. In addition, with
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careful planning the disadvantages of total contractor logis-
tics support can be minimized or eliminated, whereas the
advantages of this concept are inherent and will occur when-
ever the concept is implemented. Although the total contrac-
tor logistics support program is in its infancy in the Navy
today, this concept will claim an ever increasing share of
the Navy's aviation logistics support in the future.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the research and analysis conducted in the
process of completing this thesis, the following suggested
methods of enhancing the Navy's future contractor logistics
support programs are recommended.
1. Coordinate an aviation logistics support symposium
with the Army and Air Force for the purpose of furthering
the knowledge of all concerned on how the other services
contract for aviation logistics support. The agenda should
include a complete description of each service's aviation
logistics support contract types and lessons learned from
previous contractor support experiences.
2. All new aircraft acquisition programs should be
studied for possible use of interim contractor logistics
support, contractor material and intermediate/depot mainten-
ance support, or total contractor logistics support.
3. Particular attention should be directed to the en-
listed sea-shore rotation problem when planning future
aviation logistics support contracts. Every effort should
be made to alleviate this problem by use of contracts for
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aviation logistics support of sea duty, overseas duty, and
undesirable CONUS aviation activity locations.
M-. The possibility of contracting for total/partial
logistics support of Naval Air Stations and other shore-





Depot Maintenance - That maintenance performed on aircraft
requiring major overhaul or a complete rebuild of parts,
assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, including the
manufacture or parts, modifications, testing and reclama-
tion as required. Depot maintenance serves to support low-
er categories of maintenance by providing technical assist-
ance and performing that maintenance beyond the capability
of lower level activities.
Direct Maintenance Man Hours - The total number of accumu-
lated direct labor hours (in hours and tenths) expended in
performing a maintenance function.
Intermediate Maintenance - That maintenance which is the
responsibility of, and is performed by, designated mainten-
ance activities in support of using organizations. Its
functions normally consist of calibration, off-equipment
repair or replacement, repair or replacement of damaged
or unserviceable parts, and providing technical assistance
to using organizations.
NATOPS - An acronym formed from the words "Naval Air Train-
ing and Operating Procedures Standardization." It is a
standard operating procedures manual for aviation.
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Not Operationally Ready Maintenance (NORM) - A condition
status of an aircraft which is not operationally ready,
because maintenance work must be accomplished such as
scheduled inspections and unscheduled maintenance.
Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) - A condition status
of an aircraft which is not operationally ready nor can
maintenance work be performed to return it to an operation-
ally ready status until the required items of supply become
available
.
Operationally Ready (OR) - A condition status which indi-
cates that an aircraft is safe for flight and that essen-
tial equipment necessary for performance of its primary
mission is operative.
Organizational Maintenance - Those maintenance functions
normally performed by an operating unit on a day to day
basis in support of its own operations. This work is nor-
mally accomplished by maintenance personnel assigned to
the aircraft reporting custodian; however, in some in-
stances organizational maintenance is performed by inter-
mediate or depot level activities.
Quality Assurance - A planned and systematic pattern of
all actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that






The following are minimum standards or requirements, re-
quired at the time of delivery of the subject airplane unless
otherwise stated. All material/equipment shall be CFE (Con-
tractor Furnished Equipment) . Only new aircraft with accept-
ance flight and delivery flight time on airframes and engines
are required.
A. GENERAL
1. The aircraft shall:
a. Be a twin-engine, turbine-powered aircraft cap-
able of self-starting, and FAA type certificated under FAR-
23, 25 or equivalent on the date of response to the RFP
.
b. Have provisions for crew of two pilots seated
side-by-side, a forward facing cockpit observer, plus a
minimum of two passengers.
c. Have a maximum gross take-off weight of 9000-
15000 pounds.
d. The airplane shall have a service life not less
than 12,000 hours and 3 0,00 landings, as demonstrated by
laboratory test, for operation in the category for which
certificated
.
e. Be capable of operating on JP-M- and JP-5 fuel.
f. Have aircraft runway clearance compatible with
runways rigged with cross-deck arresting gear equipment (E-28
M-21) with take-off and touchdown speed considerations.
g. Have exterior paint finish in accordance with
the high visibility color requirements of specification
MIL-C-18263. Insignia and marking and warning and caution-
ary markings shall be in accordance with MIL-I-18M-64 and
MIL-M-25047.
h. Be FAA certified under FAR parts 2 3 or 2 5 for
operation into known icing conditions.
i. Have adequate visibility for formation flying
and to insure safe operations of the aircraft under VFR
conditions
.
j. Have an FAA Supplemental Type Certificate on
that model which incorporates any Navy unique requirements
necessitating such a supplemental certification on date of





1.0 SCOPE . The contractor shall, at the time and in the
manner stated in the contract, provide all materials, ser-
vices, tools, facilities, and data (including maintenance
requirements/specifications), required to support and main-
tain all VTAM(X) aircraft, and support equipment acquired
from the contractor, under this contract, exercised options
of this contract, and/or follow-on contracts, which aircraft
shall be operated by the Chief, Naval Air Training Command
and based at NAS Corpus Christi, Texas, except such of the
foregoing materials, services, tools, facilities and data,
which are specified herein as being Government-furnished.
1.1 For pricing purposes, the maintenance and material
requirements are categorized as follows:
a. Squadron maintenance/materials (see para. 3.0 and
5.0) which shall be Firm Fixed Price (FFP); and
b. Conditional maintenance/materials (see para. 6.0)
and engine overhaul which shall be provisioned.
1.2 The operational requirement/environment with respect
to these deliverables (maintenance/materials) is given in
para. 7.0.
1.3 The contractor shall establish and maintain an On-site
Support Center (OSC) in Government-furnished space (see para
4.0) for the purpose of providing services and materials.
1.4 The contractor shall be solely responsible for all mat-
erials (including acquisition, configuration, repair, pack-
aging and shipping) until they are consumed in support of
the VTAM(X) aircraft. All repair and overhaul will be per-
formed in accordance with FAA approved commercial proced-
ures
,
except corrosion control, which will be as specified
herein.
1.5 The Navy shall be responsible for support and mainten-
ance of pilot personal protective equipment (except such
equipment provided as installed equipment), for maintenance
of the ramp, for providing fuel and oil for operations of
aircraft and contractor-furnished ground support equipment,
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